How do migration and immigration shape the political geography of American cities? In this article, we propose a mechanism of partisan sorting and demographic change which is tested using the mass migration of African-Americans from New Orleans to Houston, Texas in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. We argue that differences in residential choice preferences among partisans combined with demographic changes which increase diversity can induce sorting by triggering flight (migration) among ideological conservatives. Using Hurricane Katrina evacuee data from schools in Harris Country along with a variety of empirical tools, we find evidence suggesting that African-American Hurricane Katrina migration led to Republican flight.
Introduction
While elite polarization in the United States has been on the rise since the 1950s (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2016) , attitude polarization among the public on key policy issues has remained relatively constant (Fiorina and Abrams 2008) . To explain these trends, scholars point to a growing tendency of like-minded partisans to cluster together geographically, resulting in an ever growing spatial divide between Democrats and Republicans. (Bishop 2009; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Nunn and Evans 2006; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013) . Bishop (2009) , for example, finds that the proportion of "landslide counties," in which either party won by more than 10% of the presidential party vote share, increased by 21. 7% between 1976 and 2004 . When Fiorina and Abrams (2008 analyze party registration instead of presidential vote share over the same time period, however, they discover that the proportion of the American population living in "landslide counties" actually decreased from 50% in 1976 to about 15% in 2004. An absence of theoretical guidance for students of political geography adds to the confusion. While some suggest that partisans relocate on the basis of both partisanship and a variety of factors such as racial composition, income and population density (Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013) others argue about which of these factors are more or less likely to influence moving behavior (Mummolo and Nall 2017) . Mummolo and Nall (2017) make an important contribution to this debate by essentially distinguishing between "partisan sorting" and "sorting partisans"
1 and find evidence in favor of the latter phenomenon over the former. While they contend that partisans do not sort into areas on the basis of the politics of those areas, the traditional "partisan sorting" claim, they find evidence of a tendency of Republicans to relocate into Republican communities and a tendency of Democrats to also relocate to more Republican communities.
Other research on sorting by ideology rather than partisanship finds that when liberals live in more conservative areas they tend to move to more liberal areas and when conservatives live in more liberal areas, they tend to move to more conservative areas (Motyl et al. 2014) . Motyl et al. (2014) argue that this ideological sorting occurs as a result of individuals' desire to feel a sense of belonging to their community. This claim is similar to the explanation provided by Mummolo and Nall (2017) to account for their finding that Republicans tend to sort into more Republican areas: people tend to relocate to communities similar to those of their current residences.
Thus, Republicans appear to be "sorting partisans," in that they happen to relocate to areas where there are more Republicans, but not necessarily because there are more Republicans there.
These findings raise two interesting questions. First, how do noticeable changes within communities, for example as the result of demographic shifts, affect residents' propensity to relocate? Demographic changes within communities have the potential to alter those communities to the extent that they are no longer familiar to long-time residents. As a result, if people seek communities similar to the ones that they are familiar with, demographic changes could prompt residents to seek other communities which are similar to their community prior to a demographic shift. This observation leads to a second question: who are those most likely to relocate when a demographic shift occurs and is this tied to partisanship?
In this paper we attempt to answer both of these questions and to understand the potential implications of these answers for partisan sorting. We first develop the Migration-Sorting (MiS) theory, which proposes a mechanism of partisan demographic change. We argue that Schelling tolerance preferences for neighborhood racial and ethnic composition are strongly correlated with political ideology. As a result, diversity increasing migration events catalyze a sorting process in which conservatives tend to flee while liberals remain. The theory is then tested by assessing the political impacts of African-American Hurricane Katrina migration on neighborhoods, schools and counties in an around Houston, Texas.
The Migration-Sorting Theory
Since the 1950s, scholars have found that the introduction of ethnically and racially diverse migrants into urban communities typically results in displacement of whites and segregation along racial and ethnic lines (Boustan 2010; Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Duncan and Duncan 1957; Fligstein 2013; Wilson 1985) .
Recent studies find evidence of white flight in a variety of contexts. The best causal estimates of white flight in metropolitan areas resulting from African-American migration from the South during the time of the Second Great Migration suggests that each African-American arrival to northern cities led to 2.7 white departures, on average (Boustan 2010) .
In an analysis of tract-level Census data, Card, Mas, and Rothstein (2008) identify "racial tipping points," the minority share in a neighborhood beyond which practically all whites leave, and find that tipping points tend to range between 5% and 20% of the minority population share in the cities that they explore. Consistent with our theory described below, they also find that tipping points tend to be higher in cities in which whites have more "tolerant racial attitudes" and tend to vote Democratic. Fairlie and Resch (2002) find evidence of "white flight" into private schools in response to the presence of minority schoolchildren and Betts and Fairlie (2003) find that immigration induces "native flight," mostly of whites, from schools in response to rises in immigrant minority populations. Schelling (1971) States with mostly white, Republican-learning suburbs and generally diverse, Democratic-learning inner cities (Gainsborough 2005) .
In analyses of survey data below, we find that political ideology is strongly correlated with measures of Schelling tolerance. If this is true, then flight induced by increases in diversity should result in both racial and ideological sorting under certain conditions. This correlation between political ideology and Schelling tolerance is the basis of the Migration-Sorting (MiS) theory. shift causes an increase in neighborhood diversity, a sorting process is triggered. Less tolerant, ideologically conservative individuals will tend to relocate in response to increases in diversity, while more tolerant, ideologically liberal individuals will remain. This process, we argue, is an engine which can drive partisan sorting as ideologically conservative "movers" and liberal "stayers" cluster together.
Ideology and Neighborhood Diversity
The MiS theory relies on two assumptions: (1) individuals tolerate diversity, but tend to prefer neighbors like themselves and; (2) tolerance is a function of several factors, but political ideology is among the most important. The first assumption is just a restatement of agent behavior in the Schelling model while the second extends the model to account for variation in tolerance between individuals.
Survey data presented below clearly demonstrates that preferences for neighborhood racial and ethnic diversity and willingness to relocate based on them are strongly linked to political ideology. The first analysis is based on data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality which was conducted in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit and Los Angeles between 1992 and 1994 (Bobo et al. 2000) . As part of this study, respondents were asked questions about their preferences for neighborhood diversity.
White respondents were presented with the five cards shown in Figure 2 in sequential order. Each card contains three hypothetical neighborhoods with a specific level of racial and ethnic diversity. The respondent is asked to imagine him or herself as residing in the house at the center of each neighborhood. Card 1 represents an all white neighborhood, Card 2 represents neighborhoods with 7% non-white minority residents, Card 3 represents neighborhoods with 20% non-white minority residents, Card 4 represents neighborhoods with 33% non-white minority residents and Card 5 represents a majority-minority neighborhood with 53% non-white minority residents. After viewing each card, respondents were asked questions about their level of comfort in each of the neighborhood sets presented. If they indicated discomfort with either neighborhood, they were also asked whether they would try to move out.
To assess the extent to which political ideology is related to tolerance for diversity and willingness to move, we estimated a series of logistic regressions using two dependent variables: 1) comfort levels 2 for each set of neighborhoods presented (7%,20%,33% and 53% non-white minority neigh-borhoods) and; 2) conditional on discomfort, willingness to move out of a similar neighborhood.
In Equation 1 Comf ort c is a binary variable in which 1 = "comfortable in neighborhood" and 0 = "uncomfortable in neighborhood" for each card/neighborhood minority proportion c = 7%, 20%, 33%, 53%. Ideology is the political ideology of the respondent on an ordinal 1-7 scale where 1 = Extremely Liberal and 7 = Extremely Conservative, X is a matrix of respondent characteristics which include age, sex, years of education, family income and interviewer race. m j are city fixed effects. Figure 3 is a plot of the predicted probability of respondent discomfort versus respondent ideology from four logistic regressions (on for each neighborhood/card). When the neighborhood consists of only 7% minority residents, political ideology does not predict discomfort well. As the hypothetical minority proportion of the population rises, however, conservatism strongly predicts probability of discomfort. Table 1 contains raw coefficient estimates from each of the four logistic regression equations estimated in which the outcome was comfort in the 7%, 20%, 33% and 53% minority neighborhoods. The information presented above points to a strong link between Schelling tolerance and political ideol- ogy. This does not necessarily imply, however, that conservatives are more likely to move out of their neighborhood when diversity increases. Indeed, despite having less tolerance for diversity, conservatives may still be more reluctant than liberals to relocate when it changes.
Table 2 -Raw logistic regression coefficients for regression of whether the respondent would indicate that they would move out of the neighborhoods with 7%, 20%, 33% or 53% minority populations as shown to them in the cards presented in Figure 2 on political ideology (1 = Very Liberal, 7 = Very Conservative) among white respondents across several major U.S. cities from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality, 1992-1994. Full model is in column (3).
Move out of any neighborhood (7%-53% minority) Table 2 , N = 1,730
To assess this claim, we estimated the model in Equation 2 in which the outcome was whether respondents indicated that they would move out of each neighborhood. A plot of the predicted probability of moving versus respondent ideology from Equation 2 clearly suggests that the odds that an individual will relocate in response to an increase in neighborhood diversity are also much higher among conservatives. Raw coefficient values from Equation 2 in Table 2 also demonstrate that this result is robust to model specification.
Results from a 2000 General Social Survey (GSS) module also show differences in neighborhood ethnic and racial preference by ideology. In the GSS module, respondents were presented with a hypothetical neighborhood with their house at the center and a group of 14 houses surrounding them. They were then asked to "imagine a neighborhood that you personally would feel most comfortable in" and subsequently instructed to indicate the preferred ethnic/racial background (Asian, Black, Hispanic or White) of each of the 14 houses surrounding them shown in Figure 5 .
To assess the relationship between political ideology and neighborhood racial and ethnic composition, for each political ideology level 3 , we averaged the percent white indicated by white respondents. erally less than 50% white, while conservative whites overwhelmingly prefer less diverse neighborhoods that are well over 50% white.
To assess the connection between political ideology and neighborhood composition preferences in relation to other personal characteristics, we estimated the following OLS regression using 770 white GSS respondents from 2000.
%White Preferred = α + βIdeology + XΓ + c j +
In Equation 3 % White Preferred is the preferred proportion white indicated by white respondents, Ideology is political ideology, X is a matrix of respondent level covariates which include Age, Education, Income, Sex, Marital Status, Employment Status and Number of Children and c j are region fixed effects.
Results from Table 3 are consistent with those of white respondents from the Multi-City Study on Urban Inequality conducted about a decade earlier.
These results clearly demonstrate that political ideology is strongly tied to neighborhood racial and ethnic composition preferences among whites and willingness to relocate based on these preferences. Thus, if white flight occurs as the result of significant changes to neighborhood racial and ethnic composition, the whites that leave will be significantly more likely to be conservative.
As discussed above, the literature is replete with evidence that increases in diversity lead to white flight. Our theory adds to this by simply suggesting that the whites who flee are predominately conservative. We argue that relocation of white Republican residents in response to Katrina migration should result in decreases in white student enrollment as a function of both evacuee presence and area conservatism as measured by
Republican vote share in precincts within a 3km radius of these schools. As a result, β 1 should be negative and statistically significant in the years following Hurricane Katrina but not statistically significant in the years prior to hurricane Katrina. If there was evidence of the latter, we would have to conclude that evacuee presence was not responsible for declines in white enrollment in more conservative areas, but that evacuees happened to be assigned to schools in more conservative areas that had declining white enrollments prior to the arrival of Katrina evacuees.
As Table 4 shows, values for β 1 are consistent with predictions made by 
Katrina Migration and Partisan Sorting
Evidence presented above suggests that the arrival of Katrina evacuees resulted in white flight and conservative neighborhood decline. We argue that processes accompanying flight and increases in diversity should lead to greater ideological homogeneity within neighborhoods or higher levels of geography as Republicans move out. As noted by Mummolo and Nall Texas are held in off-cycle years (1998, 2002, 2006, 2010) 
Synthetic Controls
In an ideal world, assessing the causal effect of Katrina migration on Re- In Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) , the authors approach estimating this counter-factual outcome as a factor model. To accomplish this, they design a method which is geared toward constructing a "synthetic control" or counterfactual outcome as a weighted average of outcomes from a "synthetic control unit", a group of units which are similar to the unit that experienced the intervention in relevant ways, but that did not receive the intervention.
Specifically, for our scenario, assume that a group of j = 2, .., J counties in Texas outside of Harris County that not experience Katrina migration in 2005 and also voted for the Republican governor of Texas. The synthetic control method uses these counties, also called the "donor pool", to construct a "counterfactual" Harris County, and hence estimate a counterfactual outcome, R N it , using the following factor model:
where ω = (ω 2 , · · · , ω J ) are a series of weights assigned to each county j; R jt is the Republican vote share for county j at time t; δ t , θ t and λ t are common factor loadings across units, parameter estimates and common factors, respectively. Z j is a vector of observed covariates and µ j are factor loadings for the common factors.
The goal of the synthetic control method is is estimate an optimal set of 
The means by which this synthetic control unit was constructed and the covariates chosen is described in more detail below.
In order to construct a counterfactual Harris County, we first established Orleans that migrated between these years were removed from the analysis.
These counties include Dallas, Jefferson , Bexar, Denton, Randall, Galveston, Smith, Fort Bend and Collin. While American Community Survey estimates suggest that there were African-American Katrina migrants in counties outside of this group, identifiers for these smaller counties are unavailable. As a result, the causal effect of Katrina migration as estimated by the synthetic control method will be biased downwards.
After removing the 9 counties mentioned above, the donor pool consisted of 244 counties. To construct the counterfactual Harris county, the synthetic control algorithm generated weights for each of the remaining 244 counties which, when combined, produced a synthetic control unit that best matches
Harris County based on relevant pre-Katrina covariates. These covariates include: gubernatorial Republican vote share in 2002, 1998 and 1990 and % black in 2000 and 1990 .
Treated Synthetic % Black (2000) 18.5 18.4 % Black (1990) 19.2 19.1 % Republican (2002) 55.9 56.9 % Republican (1998) 65.7 66.7 % Republican (1990) 48.1 48.9 While these effects are large, we cannot exclude the possibility that they were driven by chance variation produced by the synthetic control model. To address this concern, a series of placebo tests was conducted by constructing a synthetic control unit for each donor county which did not experience high levels of Katrina migration and then estimating the gap in Republican 56.6% yielding a decrease of 2.13%. Thus, the decline in the white population in Harris county was over 5 times the increase of the black population during the same period. This suggests that declines in the white population are more 7 This was calculated by simply multiplying the probability that the results were due to chance alone in 2006 with the probability that they were due to chance alone in 2010. While migration data on inflows from Harris into nearby counties mentioned above are not available by race, the Internal Revenue Service Series on Income (SOI) provides detailed information on county-to-county inflows and outflows for each year shortly before and after Hurricane Katrina migration.
IRS migration data is considered to be the most accurate data available for tracking migration patterns between counties because, unlike Census data, it is not subject to sampling error (Conway and Rork 2016; Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak 2017; Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017) . Migration is tracked by counting the number of exemptions and returns for individuals that resided While earlier experiments in social psychology found that whites have strong tendencies to judge neighborhood quality on the basis of race (Krysan, Farley, and Couper 2008) , recent research suggests that the connection between perceptions of neighborhood quality and race differ dramatically by partisanship. Mummolo and Nall (2017) , for example, find that white Democrats and Republicans agree that neighborhood "quality" is the most important factor informing decisions about where to live, but how each group defines "quality" depends largely upon neighborhood racial composition. Indeed, according to their findings, Democrats tend to associate "high-quality" neighborhoods as areas high in "diversity," while Republicans associate diversity with lower quality neighborhoods. Gimpel and Hui (2015) similarly find that differential judgments about neighborhood quality are rooted in partisanship.
The main thrust of Mummolo and Nall (2017) is that partisans do not use the partisan composition of neighborhoods as a relevant criteria when deciding where to move. Our findings and the theory that we develop here builds upon this research and demonstrates that partisan sorting can occur even when decisions about where to move are not made on the basis of partisanship, but rather on the basis of changes in other neighborhood characteristics, such as neighborhood racial composition, which are strongly correlated with partisanship. These findings are consistent with other recent research on sorting by partisanship which not only finds evidence that partisans tend to sort geographically, but they do so primarily out of a desire to feel a sense of belonging to their community (Motyl et al. 2014 ).
This research also has implications for the political consequences of diversity and multiculturalism. Specifically, it suggests that changes in racial and ethnic heterogeneity will, at least in the context of political geography,
give rise to political homogeneity and partisan sorting. This has implications not only for the United States but for other countries as well in which residential choice preferences are linked to partisan identification and in which the phenomenon of sorting by partisanship has been observed. Gallego et al.
over and above partisan selection effects. Thus, if changes in racial composition tend to trigger a partisan sorting process and sorting is amplified by contexual effects, then the results of this study may suggest that partisan sorting and its subsequent political effects are perhaps one of the inevitable by-products of thriving diverse, multicultural urban centers. Related to this are implications for more immediate political consequences of immigration.
While new immigrants obviously cannot directly affect election outcomes, they may indirectly affect Democratic voting by inducing Republican flight from urban centers. This suggests that current discussions about the political consequences of immigration, while not being shortsighted, are missing an important piece of the puzzle. 
